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THE PROBLEMS CAUSING THE REAL ESTATE CRASH-A LEGAL, 
ETHICAL AND MORAL PROSPECTIVE* 
Richard D. Gritta,  
University of Portland, Oregon USA 
Ryan Gillespie,  
University of Portland, USA 
The collapse of the “real estate bubble” has caused the financial devastation of personal wealth, not 
only in this country, but around the world. Its effects are still with us as world economies try to grow 
and return to normalcy in late 2014. It is critical that we understand the events that led to the bubble, 
and the legal and ethical standards that were violated allowing it to become so inflated.  Those that 
don’t know history are doomed to repeat its mistakes, as it is often said. Investors didn’t learn that from 
the DOTCOM bubble burst in 2000, and it took just a few short years after that bubble popped to repeat 
mistakes behind that bubble.  There were two primary causes of the boom/bust in real estate.  The first 
was the necessary condition and the second were the sufficient conditions that came into play once the 
necessary condition was in place. The necessary condition was the repeal of the Glass Steagall Act of 
1933. The sufficient conditions were many.  They included fraud in the origination of mortgages, 
fraudulent real estate appraisals, the use of ARM and Option ARM contracts deceptively sold to naïve 
investors, the proliferation of exotic mortgage products, the securitization food chain designed in some 
cases to hide the risk of packages of mortgages, biased bond ratings by Moody’s and Standard & 
Poor’s, the abject failure of regulators and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to intervene, 
overleverage by home buyers and my investment banks, and the immoral use of drugs and sex on Wall 
Street. This paper will examine these conditions in detail. 
Keywords: Real estate crash, Fraud in mortgage origination, Ethical/moral aspects. 
 
* 
 
The collapse of the “real estate bubble” has caused the financial devastation of personal wealth, not only 
in this country, but around the world. Its effects are still with us as world economies try to grow and 
return to normalcy in 2014. It is critical that we understand the events that led to the bubble and the legal 
and ethical standards that were violated allowing it to become so inflated.Those that don’t know history 
are doomed to repeat its mistakes, as is often said. Investors didn’t learn that from the DOTCOM bubble 
burst in 2000, the Long-Term Capital Management debacle in the late 1990s, and it took just a few short 
years to repeat mistakes behind that bubble.   
There were two primary causes of the boom/bust in real estate.  The first was the necessary 
condition and the second were the sufficient conditions that came into play once the necessary condition 
was allowed to occur. These conditions could not have come to pass without the primary cause. The 
sufficient conditions were many.  They included fraud in the origination of mortgages, fraudulent real 
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estate appraisals, the use of ARM and Option ARM contracts deceptively sold to naïve investors, the 
proliferation of exotic mortgage products, the securitization food chain designed in some cases to hide 
real the risk of packages of mortgages, biased bond ratings by Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s, the abject 
failure of regulators and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to intervene, overleverage by 
homebuyer and investment banks on Wall Street, and the immoral use of drugs and sex on Wall Street. 
This paper will examine these conditions in detail. 
The Necessary Condition 
The necessary condition for the real estate crisis was the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933. The bill 
was sponsored by Senators Carter Glass of Virginia, the founder of the U.S. Federal Reserve System, and 
Henry Bascom Steagall of Alabama, Chairman of the House Banking and Currency Committee. The bill 
was aimed at rampant abuses in the commercial banking system that contributed greatly to the cause and 
severity of the Great Depression.  Commercial banks were major underwriters of corporate securities 
during the boom years of the 1920s.  In addition, investors could speculate on stocks by margining those 
stocks with loans from commercial banks, and those banks set the margin requirements, the amount 
stockholders had to put down to purchase stocks and bonds.  What resulted was a house of cards.  As 
soon as one card was pulled, the house collapsed. The imprudent underwriting of corporate securities led 
to bank failures when the stock market collapsed. Falling stock prices resulted in margin calls and 
investors couldn’t “mark to the market” further contributing to the economic depression. 
In the wake of the Great Depression, pressure on Congress resulted in the passage of the Glass-
Steagall Act which constructed a “firewall” between commercial banking and investment banking. In 
effect, commercial banks could no longer underwrite securities in the primary or new issues market. 
Subsequently under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, stock margin controls were given to the Federal 
Reserve Board.  
The firewall was torn down by theGramm-Leach-BlileyAct in 1999.  The year before the Act was 
passed, Citicorp, a commercial bank holding company, merged with the insurance company Travelers 
Group in 1998 to form Citigroup.  The combination included banking (Citibank), securities (Smith 
Barney) and insurance services(Primerica and Travelers). Because this merger was clearly a violation of 
the Glass–Steagall Act, as well as the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, the Federal Reserve gave 
Citigroup a temporary waiver in September of 1998. Less than a year later, GLB was passed to legalize 
these types of mergers. The law also repealed Glass–Steagall’s conflict of interest prohibitions against 
bank officers and directors serving simultaneously as officers or directors of a securities firm. It made 
legal the merger of Travelers and Merrill Lynch the prior year, thus settling the stage for the many abuses, 
the secondary conditions that followed. The net result of all the mergers that were now allowed before the 
crash was the domination of the industry by the following few institutions:1 
 
Investment Banks Financial 
Conglomerates 
Securities  
Insurance Companies 
Rating 
Agencies 
Goldman Sach 
Morgan Stanley 
Lehman Brothers 
Merrill Lynch 
Bears Stern 
CitiCorp 
JP Morgan 
AIG 
MBIA 
AMBAC 
Moody’s 
Standard &Poor’s 
Fitch 
 
1
 It should be noted that prior to the mid-1980s, investment banks were partnerships with only limited capital 
provided by the partners themselves.  These firms then went public and raised large amounts of money which 
allowed for tremendous expansion.In the mid-1970s, Lehman Brothers had only one office-that in NYC- with a staff 
of just over 100. At the time of its bankruptcy in2008, it was worldwide with over a 100,000 total employees.  
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The concentration of the firms in this industry would have serious consequences if/when problems arose. 
The failure of Lehman Brother froze the U.S. financial system and ushered in the start of the so-called 
“Great Recession.” 
The Sufficient Conditions 
There were a large number of conditions that followed in the wake of the passage of Gramm-Leach-
Bliley. The blame for the crash can be attributed to a whole host of people and institutions; the Federal 
Reserve Board, investment banks/commercial banks, loan originators, real estate mortgage brokers, real 
estate appraisers, real estate brokers, greed on the part of home buyers, greed on the part of the Wall 
Street elite, over leverage by both individuals and investment banking houses, the fraud by credit rating 
agencies such as Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s, the failure of the SEC and other regulators to act, etc.  
What follows is a discussion of each of these factors for it was the sum total of all these factors that led to 
the severity and persistence of the Great Recession. The U.S. economy isstill digging out from the 
damage caused. 
Alan Greenspan and the Fed: Afraid that the US economy would suffer from the DOTCOM 
bubble burst which siphoned off over a trillion dollars of U.S. investors net worth, Greenspan, Chairman 
of the Federal Reserve Board, kept interest rates low-very low.2By its very easy monetary policy, the Fed 
hoped to encourage investment and to help stabilize and grow the U.S. economy. Low interest rates on 
mortgage loansalso made housing far more affordable. For example, the monthly payment on a $200,000, 
30 year mortgage loan at 9% is $1,609.25; at 5%, that payment is only $555.56.  The lower payments 
resulting from this easy monetary policy, encouraged people to buy homes. In many cases, however, 
people bought homes that would normally be beyond their reach (especially when buyers had usedARMs, 
Adjustable Rate Mortgages).The following charts the mortgage rate for a number of years before the 
crash. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
 To some extent, the huge inflow of Chinese funds into the U.S., the result of its large trade surpluses with the U.S., 
did take away some of Greenspan’s ability to control the money supply. The flood of money helped keep interest 
rates low. 
30 YEAR FIXED MORTGAGE RATE 
YEAR INT.RATE YEAR INT.RATE 
1991 9.64% 1999 7.04% 
1992 8.76% 2000 7.85% 
1993 8.02% 2001 6.95% 
1994 7.06% 2002 7.00% 
1995 9.10% 2003 5.32% 
1996 7.20% 2004 5.45% 
1997 7.65% 2005 5.73% 
1998 7.13% 2006 5.76% 
 2007 5.78% 
Source: Federal Reserve Chart Book (various 
issues) 
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Rates were significantly lower after the DOTCOM bubble burst as can be seen from the above.This 
had one good intended consequence-homes were more affordable But it also fueled price increases as 
time went on. It ultimately led to the intense speculation that inflated the housing bubble. Loan payments 
could also be reduced substantially by using newer loans such as Option ARMs as will be discussed 
below. 
The Search for the Next “Magic” Media for Investment:The end of the Soviet Union in 1989,and 
the dominance of the U.S. as an unopposed superpower fueled optimism about the future. Many younger 
investors, especially married DINKS (double income no kids),were flush with cash in the early and mid-
1990s. They had never experienced a real market crash. They had little knowledge of the risk return 
tradeoffs in the marketplace and/or at least were convinced that the U.S. economy had entered a new era 
of sustained growth. They invested heavily in stocks, especially internet stocks. But “perception” doesn’t 
necessarily jibe with reality.  The following shows the reality of risk vs. return: 
Long run returns in the market over the period 1926-2007, were about 11% for large cap stocks and 
over 17% for smaller stocks, but the standard deviations around these returns were 23% and 34%, 
respectively. The lesson gulled from this evidence is that stocks are highly risky. The crash of the 
DOTCOM bubble burned a lot of these young very naïve investors.  Having learned a brutal lesson about 
investing in ethereal ideas like internet stocks, they were easily led to a tangible asset you could 
physically possess, real estate, and it was highly leverageable.Fear of loss returned. This 
factor’scontribution to the real estate bubble should not be minimized.  
Bending of Loan Standards as Home Prices Rose: Conservative lending practices normally 
required a borrower have income of 4X the monthly payments on a mortgage; the so-called 25% rule. 
Some lender pushed that percentage to as high as 40% or more, especially in hot markets like California, 
Las Vegas and others, thus putting the borrower at a much greater riskof default (see subprime chart 
below).  Many assumed that real estate prices would continue to rise and so the danger seemed small.  It 
wasn’t-enter the next factor. 
The Ethical and Moral Abuses in the Real Estate Market:NODOC (no documentationor “stated 
income loans”) and NINJA (no income jobs or assets)loans were pushed on naïve home buyers by 
unethicalmortgage brokers.3Other practices included predatory lending andthe misleading use of ARM 
and option ARM contracts. The proliferation of exotic mortgage productsexploded. ARMs and interest 
only mortgage products were only intended for a very small subset of mortgage applicants. These 
included high income sales professionals or other applicants expecting either a quick resale or an 
impending financial windfall. Most applicants steered into these loans were a poor match for the products. 
They could never be expected to afford the payments on such loans beyond a year or two if interest rates 
were to increase. This was unethical, immoral and criminal.Many of these brokers were earning upwards 
of $30,000 a month pushing people into housing investments.Because they would sell the loans off to 
Fannie Mae or to investment banking houses, these brokers didn’t have any liability for the bad loans they 
originated.  They got the reward, their origination fees, but took no risk.   
 
3
 For an excellent discussion of all these factors, see; Lawrence McDonald, The Colossal Failure of Common Sense: 
The Inside Story of the Collapse of Lehman Brothers,(N.Y.: Crown Publishing Company, 2009), Ch.5. 
 Mean St. Dev. 
Small Cap Stocks 17.2% 33.7% 
Large Cap Stocks 10.8% 23.4% 
Treasury Bills 3.8% 3.1% 
Inflation 3.1%  
Data from: Ibbotson and Sinquefield 
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Ineffective Mortgage Controls: In a clear violation of ethical principles, many brokers profiteered 
by steering applicants into bad loan products precisely because these loans (especially subprime 
mortgages)carried much higher commissions or yield spread premiums.Some brokers crossed the line 
even further by committing fraud. They lied on loan applications or coached applicants on how to lie to 
improve acceptance of their application. The fabled NINJA loan is a direct result of such fraud. Others 
pressured applicants into signing mortgage documents that were for a different loan product than was 
discussed. Investigations of fraud and convictions for criminal activity were few, while fraudulent acts 
were widespread. There was a complete failure of regulators to protect homebuyers.The Federal Reserve 
and the SEC did nothing, in spite of FBI investigations into mortgage fraud in the early 2000s. 
The Subprime Loan-Loan to Value Limits Expanded-: To further expand “opportunities” to 
home buyers/speculators, subprime loans were created.A borrower could actually get a loan for more than 
a home’s value. The origination of subprime loans increased over 878% from 2000-2006, while prime 
loans only increased 65% over the same period according to the Mortgage Banker Association. 
Lenders assumed that home values would continue to rise at rates higher than they historically had 
risen. What they failed to account for is that the housing market had become a massive bubble, and that it 
would soon burst. A conventional mortgage usually limits the loan to value ratio to 80% of the purchase 
price. Other products such as FHA and other CRA backed programs allowed for up to 100%. These were 
not the problem. The problem arose from lenders allowing for loan to value ratios of up to 120%. This 
exacerbated the negative equity situation that many distressed homeowners currently still find themselves 
locked into. They were “underwater” and could not sell or refinance their mortgages as they owed more 
than the home was worth. 
The following chart shows the proportion of these loans which were dangerous ARMs, Option 
ARMs and Interest Only loans. DTI is the debt to income ratio.  As noted above, the norm for this ratio 
should have been 25% on prime loans. Ratios this high were clearly imprudent.4 To expose borrowers to 
the risk, without their understanding of those risks, was/is unethical and immoral in the authors’ opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
The proportions of these more complex and dangerous contracts grew substantially in the mid-2000s.  
The chart below shows the major culprits feeding off the home buyer frenzy.5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4
 Richard Gritta, Adams B., and Seal J., "Recipe for a Bubble: Financial Leverage and the Other Variables Behind 
the Housing Crisis- A Teaching Note." Journal for Advancements in Business Education.I, 1(Summer 2012), 12. 
5 Ibid. 
SUBPRIME LOANS 
YEAR % ARMS %INT. ONLY LOW DOC DTI 
2000 70.3% 0 23% 38.6% 
2001 72.0% 0 26% 39.1% 
2002 73.5% 0.7% 31% 39.4% 
2003 67.7% 3.7% 34% 39.7% 
2004 76.8% 15.3% 37% 40.3% 
2004 80.9% 26.5% 41% 41.0% 
2006 76.2% 76.2% 43% 41.8% 
Source: Zimmerman UBS report (2007)  
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The top 12 subprime lenders accounted for 91.4% of the total amount of subprime loans made.The 
following chart shows the “advantage” to a borrower by using ARMs and Interest Only loans to make a 
home more affordable. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Negative amortization loans can result when a home buyer has an Option ARM loan.6  That option 
gives the borrower the right to pay interest only, some principleor interest, or to make no payments at all 
for the length of the option period. By using the option, as can be seen above, the borrower could 
substantially lower the monthly payment for the option period. At the end of that period, the home owner 
 
6
 The calculation of the Interest Only ARM is fairly simple.  The loan would be for $180,000 or 80% of the 
$225,000.  Interest only is therefore: $180,000 x 0.0442 x 1/12 = $663 (or 61.4% of the $1,079 payment).  The 
calculation of the other payments is far more complex. 
SUBPRIME LENDER VOL. (in bil.) 
HSBC $53 
New Century $52 
Countrywide $41 
Citi Mortgage $38 
Ameriquest $30 
Well Fargo Mortgage $28 
Washington Mutual $26 
Top 12 Subprime Lenders $410 
Total Subprime $449 
Alternative Mortgages and Initial Monthly Payments 
Mortgage Type Initial Monthly 
Payment 
Payment as Percent  
of  FRMPayment 
Fixed Rate Mortgage [FRM] 
 
$1,079.19 100.0% 
Adjustable Rate 
 
903.50 83.7% 
Interest-Only/ARM 
 
663.00 61.4% 
40-year Amortization ARM 
 
799.98 74.1% 
Negative Amortization ARM 
 
150.00 13.9% 
Note: Interest rates used in each calculation were 6.00% for FRM and 4.42% for 
Standard ARMs. A house price of $225,000 and 20% down were assumed. 
Source: Freddie Mac for the periods 2003-2006. 
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would owe morethan the original balance borrow at the origination of the contract. Many took out Option 
ARMs and chose the option to pay low payments, therefore accepting the negative amortization, on the 
grounds that the home price would increase substantially. They figured that all they would be doing was 
giving up some profits to in order to maximize their leverage.  This turned out to be disastrous.   
The Ethical Standards in Real Estate Appraisal:The faulty, sometimes fraudulent 
appraisal/valuation of homes, contributed to the crisis. Some appraisers were pushed to value homes at 
inflated prices because they were pressured by unethical real estate sales people hungry to increase sales, 
and hence their own commissions. One of the authors interviewed a number of licensed appraisers who 
admitted to this problem.  “I need this house to appraise at $700,000” one appraiser was told by a real 
estate agent. In fact, that appraiser’s estimate of fair market value was less than $500,000 based on 
traditional appraisal techniques. That appraiser lost his fee when the agent got angry with him. 
The Proliferation of “Get Rich Quick” Seminars:The greed of people wanting more than they 
had, and “ready and willing” to be convinced by unethical lenders and realtors that they “could” have 
what they wanted-even when they really couldn’t afford it- was a significant influence in the crash. These 
seminars pitched home ownership to people as a mean of increasing wealth without risk. “Prices will rise 
unabated”, they claimed.  This led to the abuse of leverage.  At first, increased house prices, coupled with 
low interest rates, made this strategy successful. Later, however, is resulted in defaults. 
The Effects of Excessive Leverage by Home Buyers:   The use of leverage (debt finance) can 
produce spectacular results as long as asset prices increase.   The rate of return on investment in real 
estate is a function of the rate of return on the underlying asset, its growth over time, the interest rate 
prevailing in the marketplace, and the amount of debt or financial leverage used to acquire the property.  
The relationship of the rate of return on equity, roe, is linked to all these variables.  The following 
equation is useful. 
 
roe = [roa + (roa – i)D/E] 
 
Where roa is the return on the asset, i is the interest rate on the mortgage, and D/E is the debt ratio 
used to finance the asset. An example will help explain. Assume that an investor buys a property at the 
beginning of the year for $300,000. Further assume that because of increases in the housing market that 
investor is able to sell the house for $360,000 one year later.  The investors rate of return, or roa, is 
therefore 20%, or 
 
roa =


 = 20.0% 
assuming that there were no transaction costs involved.  The return to the investors on his/her equity, 
however, is a function of the amount of debt the investor borrowed to finance that property and the 
interest rate on that mortgage.  If the investor put 5% down and borrowed the rest at an interest rate of 
5%, the investor’s D/E ratio would be $285,000/$15,000. The rate of return on equity, or roe, would thus 
be a spectacular  
 
roe=  [20% + (20%- 5%)$285,000/$15,000] = 305% 
It is worth noting that in Las Vegas, one of the hottest speculative markets in the USA, prices went 
up 43% on average in one year. If an investor purchased a $300,000 house that went up 43% in one year 
and financed it with a 5% mortgage, putting only 5% down, then that investor’s rate of return would have 
been: 
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roe=  [43% + (43%- 5%)$285,000/$15,000] = 765% 
It is easy to see how naïve investors could, and more importantly did, see real estate investment as 
the key to instant wealth.  The problem is that there was a real downside.  Leverage is a two edge sword-it 
cuts both ways.  The following chart shows what happens when the return on the asset falls below the 
interest rate on the mortgage: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Those at the top of the pyramid who took their gains and got out did very well. But as home prices 
fell many suffered big losses.  This was particularly true of people with ARM and Option AMR loans.  
The resetting of mortgage interest rate, coupled with declines in home prices was horrendous. Large 
numbers of home owners found themselves “underwater” or “upside down.” Many abandoned their 
homes, thus depressing the prices of other houses in the same neighborhood. A downward spiral ensured, 
and it damaged even those who had been rational in their financial strategies. An ethical question then 
arose: Do I continue to pay my mortgage when I have negative equity in the house, or do I abandon the 
house? Many opted for the latter choice. 
The House as ATM:Many people treated the increase equity in their homes during the boom times 
as a cash machine.  They used equity as a means to finance vacations, new cars, SUVs, sound systems, 
and other consumer durable goods. It is a classic financial mistake to use an appreciating home value to 
finance depreciating assets.  The net result was to increase the number of homeowners who were 
“underwater” and this contributed to further home price declines. 
The Securitization Food Chain: Instruments such as collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) or 
MBS (mortgage backed securities)were created. Once originated by mortgage brokers, these mortgages 
loans were then package into MBSs. This facilitated the sale of junk mortgages to unsuspecting buyers.  
Good loans were mixed with subprime mortgages to create these MBSs, and there was no way to tell the 
good from the bad in any package of loans.7 The purchasers of someMBSs blamed the computer models 
that were supposed to help hedge the risks of such securities (see the discussion of the risk model below). 
However, what they failed to realize was that the whole purpose of such models often was to hide bad 
mortgage loans in with other investments so that the buyer was unaware of the junk they were 
purchasing.They were simply looking to mask the risky loans so they could be unloaded to unsuspecting 
buyers, aided and abetted by the rating agencies.The “securitization food chain” started with the 
originators selling the loans to an investment bank which then packaged them in a MBS and sold them to 
investors (including pension funds). 
 
 
7The MBS is a form of CDO. Alan Sloan, “It’s Getting Hard to Wrap Your Brain around Subprime Mortgages,” 
Fortune, October 29, 2007. Alan Sloan is the Editor of Fortune magazine. 
 
Interest rate at 5% for various ROAs: 5% Down 
ROA INTRATE DEBT EQUITY ROE 
20.00% 5.00% 95 5 305.0% 
15.00% 5.00% 95 5 205.0% 
10.00% 5.00% 95 5 105.0% 
5.00% 5.00% 95 5 5.0% 
0.00% 5.00% 95 5 -95.0% 
-10.00% 5.00% 95 5 -295.0% 
-15.00% 5.00% 95 5 -395.0% 
-20.00% 5.00% 95 5 -495.0% 
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Home Owner 
 
Lender 
 
Investment Bank 
 
Investors 
 
AIG 
 
The Creation of CDS:AIG was a prominent player in the “food chain.” In order to hedge against 
defaults of the MBSs that were sold, AIG sold an insurance plan call the Collateralized Debt Swap or 
CDS. It sold CDS to investors for a fee, as insurance.  If the MBS failed, AIG was at risk to pay the 
investors. The problem was that anyone could buy a CDS.8An example will help demonstrate the danger. 
If a person buys insurance to insure his/her car, only that person is able to collect on the policy if the car 
is damaged.  In the world of Wall Street, anyone could buy a CDS.  It would be just like five people 
insuring that one car. When the defaults started, the impact of multiple claims threatened the solvency of 
AIG and forced its bailout by the government. In some cases, investment banks created MBSs that they 
knew would fail and then purchased CDS to bet that they would fail.9 When they ran out of MBSs to bet 
against, firms like Lehman simply created more MBSs from the securitization food chain, borrowing 
heavily to do so (see below).  
There were warnings from regulators. Brooksley Born, the head of the Commodities Future Trading 
Commission (CFTC) at the time, pushed for the regulations of these exotic derivatives.  She was opposed 
by Alan Greenspan and Larry Summers (then Secretary of the Treasury). With their strong support, 
Congress passed the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (H.R. 5660) which specifically 
banned the regulation of derivatives.  
The Moral and Ethical Abuses by the Rating Agencies: By packaging these sub-prime loans into 
MBSs, Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s and other rating agencies, were conscious contributors to the crisis. 
These derivatives were often given ratings of AAA, the highest investment grade possible, when clearly 
they were high risk vehicles. Between the years 2000 and 2007, over 45,000 MBSs were rates AAA by 
Moody’s.  These agencies were trusted by investors, both individual and institutional.  Their behavior 
wasunethical.  83% of the AAA rated MBSs were downgraded later, many just weeks before the crisis 
and the collapse of Lehman in October of 2008.  Many investors are now suing. When sued, the agencies 
argued that their ratings were “largely a matter of opinion” or “just opinions.”10 
Excessive Wall Street Compensation and the Immoral Use of Drugs and Prostitution:The 
financial rewards for selling what amounted to “junk” were obscene. The average compensation on Wall 
Street was in the millions for many at firms like Lehman, Goldman Sachs, etc.. The use of cocaine and 
 
8
 Bill Ackman, Who’s Holding the Bag?” Paper presented at the Ira Solu Conference, May 2007. The founder of 
Pershing Square Capital Management exposed the MBIA and AMBAC shakeout of subprime to come months later. 
9Sloan took Goldman Sachs to task for using CDS to hedge against their own MBS that they knew would fail. 
10
 A documentation of the ratings agencies behavior can be found on Section II of the video, The Inside Job, Sony 
Picture Classics, 2010. 
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expensive prostitutes is also well documented.11Many institutional sales people were making decisions 
while high on cocaine.  Studies at the MIT Financial Engineering Lab have shown that the areas of the 
brain stimulated by high risk behavior are the same areas that are stimulated by cocaine.  They reaped 
large bonus, but took no risk personally.  They did, however, put the solvency of their firms at risk, as the 
Lehman case demonstrated.  
Secondary Mortgage Markets Enabled Risky Loans: Lenders could never justify keeping risky 
loans on their books. Such a loan portfolio carried too much risk and would ultimately cause their 
downfall. Instead,  they packaged these loans carefully so that the buyers would not fully understand the 
risky nature of much of the loans included. Additionally, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac purchased many 
loans from lenders with the false expectation that reasonable care was taken to ensure creditworthiness 
and reasonable repayment ability of the applicants. 
The Overleverage of Investment Banking Houses-The Bankruptcy of Lehman:While investors 
were leveraging to the hilt, so were firms like Lehman, Bears Stern, etc. Overleverage by these firms 
proved even more dangerous, however.  The forced bankruptcy filing of Lehman was the result of a debt 
to equity ratio of over 44:1.  Such a high ratio violated every sound principle of finance.The high debt 
ratios were the result of borrowing heavily so that these institutions could create more MBSs that they 
could “bet” against by creating the above mentioned CDS.The SEC could have stopped this madness, but 
it didn’t. The bankruptcy of Lehman shocked the world’s stock exchanges and the credit markets nearly 
froze up.  The U.S. stood at the brink of a depression which would have made the Great Depression seem 
like a bump in the road.  Only last minute action by Congress and the President, in the form of the $700 
billion TARP program, prevented a meltdown and panic of monumental proportions. Richard Fuld, the 
President and CEO of Lehman, ran his firm into the ground.  His penalty was a nice bonus of hundreds of 
millions of dollars. 
Violations of the Securities Laws: The Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, and the Investment Company Act of 1940, all addressed 
fraud in the primary and secondary markets. They required “truth in securities” and “rules of fair practice’ 
in investment counseling. They alsobanned unethical and fraudulent sales of investment vehicles.The sale 
of these highly risky assets to pension funds and other investors, both individual and institutional, was 
clearly a violation of all of these investor protection acts. Again, the SEC should have taken action but did 
not. 
Government Guarantees: The federal government guarantees loans purchased by Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac in order to stimulate further lending activity. This promise is what contributed to the rapid 
expansion of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac loan pools. As long as the loans were guaranteed, there was 
less concern about higher rates of default. Accordingly, lenders took greater risks knowing that these risks 
could be offloaded onto federal agencies and ultimately, the taxpayer. Ironically, the same government 
interference that increased lending also contributed to its hyperactivity and decline. Because of abuses, 
these agencies were taken over by the Federal Government.  The taxpayers paid the bill.  
Too Much Reliance on Mathematic Models:Investors didn’t learn from the Long Term Capital 
Management debacle in the late 1990s.12Mathematical modelling cannot capture all the variables that 
affect the results of the models, and hedging doesn’t always work as expected. In financial risk 
management, value at risk (VaR) is/was a widely used risk measure of the risk of loss on a specific 
portfolio of financial assets. It measures historical variances and co-variances among different securities, 
thus measuring a financial institution’s exposure to risks taken. The following is the model: 

 
11
 Ibid. 
12LTCM tried to hedge their positions such that they believed all the risk was eliminated. The failure of this hedge 
fund was documented in the video, The Trillion Dollar Bet, produced by the National Public Broadcasting System.  
It can be seen on U-tube by searching for either the Trillion Dollar Bet or the Midas Formula. 
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VaRa(L) = inf{ R: P(L> )   1-!} = inf{  R : FL() " !} 
By looking at risk across all securities, the model can compare historical levels of risk for any given 
portfolio, usually with up to a 99% probability that an institution could not lose more than a certain 
amount of money, the L in the equation. That can be compared to the worst case scenario to make sure 
that that the investors can cover losses. 
The VaR didn’t, and couldn’t possibly, reflect the fraud and abuse in the system.No matter how 
elegant and complete a model may appear to be, it still can lead decision makers astray, and it 
did.Mathematical models should never be employed, no matter how elegant, without a clear 
understanding of the limits of the models. Einstein once remarked, “Elegance is for tailors.”  This model 
was a key in the crash.  
Conclusion 
This paper has detailed the necessary and sufficient conditions that led to the real estate crash and the 
“Great Recession.” The Glass-Steagall of 1933 created a firewall between commercial banking and 
investment banking. Its repeal was the necessary condition for the bubble to inflate. The Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act of 1999 set the stage for all the abuses to follow and they did.  There is no one person or 
institution that can be singled out.  A total lack of legal, ethical,and moral standards were responsible. 
Participants were the Federal Reserve Board, the regulators, such as the SEC and Congress, mortgage 
brokers, real estate appraisers, real estate agents, Wall Street firms, greed on the part of buyers and sellers, 
etc. All did their parts to create the crisis that cost trillions of dollars in losses to investors. It has been six 
years since the “bubble” burst and the U.S., Europe and Asia are still digging their way out. Investors 
need to be able to accurately assess risk and return, and institutions need to behave legally, ethically and 
morally if the abuses of the past are to be prevented.   
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